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Cooperation is a ubiquitous and yet not fully-understood phenomenon in Nature: from
humans that cooperate to build complex societies to animals like wolves that hunt in
packs in order to catch preys larger than they are, or meerkats that watch out for
predators in turn while the rest of the colony feeds. Even small microorganism cooperate
to survive in hostile environments. We focus here on the impact of the structure of a
multiplex network, a new way of representing information about interaction, on the
evolution of cooperation, using for that propose concepts of Evolutionary Game Theory.
More precisely, we explain our findings on the density of cooperators for each one of
the proposed scenarios. Then we turn our attention to the microscopic behaviour of
individuals across different layers. And finally, we analyze how the multiplex structure
alter the convergence to a stationary point and which are the fluctuations around the
stable equilibrium.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
I came to the Master in Artificial Intelligence pushed by curiosity. My PFC work was
related to this area; I investigated the versatility of artificial bee colony algorithm, a
swarm intelligence method, in order to optimize a series of non-convex functions. And
I have to confess that I was wondered by the performance. How was possible that the
interaction of many simple agents that just imitate the behavior of bees was capable
of finding a near-optimal solution to those tough function landscapes? The answer is
emergence. In this scenario, Intelligence emerges from the interaction of many simple
agents. However, what happens when the interaction is among non-trivial entities like
humans? Because the humans are not like the bees, they must not share the same
interests or priorities. What happens when these interests are in conflict? Is it possible
to find a common balance of interests that enable them to cooperate toward a common
good? A standard approach for solving such situations is Game Theory. So when my
advisors purpose me to make base research about Game theory on networks, I answered
without question: Yes!
As a first step, I looked to the applications of game theory in real-world scenarios. The
findings were astonishing; game theory has been applied to many fields. In economics in
order to study Duopolies or biology in order to explain the sex ratio in some populations
or the fighting behavior for territorially... However, in the end, I am a computer scientist,
so the question arises, where has game theory been applied in computer science?
Communications networks [5] seem a real area where to apply game theory. In this
scenario, there are multiple agents playing different roles: ISP, end-point or users. Each
of them wants to optimize the throughput, transfer speed, economic costs... These
1
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preferences do not need to be the same. So if all agents acts in a greedy way they could
cause the congestion of the system [6]. There are two examples that are often used to
explain conflict situations in a communication situation.
The first one is known as Random Access Game [7]: suppose that users want to com-
municate as soon as possible at full speed. If multiple users try to transmit at the same
time, they will fail, and that has a cost. However, if a consensus is reached, for instance
lowering the bandwidth, a more profitable scenario could be achieved. Game theory
based algorithms has been proposed to model this kind of situations [8]
The second one, the power control problem, can help us to understand what happens
in wireless scenarios. Due the proliferation of wireless devices, the electromagnetic
WiFi spectrum is a competing environment, where each user is growing in signal-to-
interference-and-noise (SINR) ratio and decreasing in power level. If the power levels
are fixed, increasing the power of a user would also increase its SINR. This act also has
implications for the other users, because the interferences will increase, reducing their
SINR, inducing them to raise their power level. That will start a defective dynamic that
will collapse the medium. Again, there are some good algorithms based in game theory
that can help to reduce this undesirable effect [9, 10].
Communication systems have enabled us to cooperate in many ways. Nowadays, thanks
to emails, social networks or videoconferences, we can share ideas without geographical
restrictions almost instantaneously. One of the most useful methods to share data is peer-
to-peer networks. These kind of systems were designed to share data in a distributed way,
without a central authority agent. The users have a partial or complete data that they
share with other users. Then, the users that have received the data share it with the rest
of the network. That behaviour increases the resilience of the structure because there are
more than one copy of the same data in many different locations. The performance of
such systems is based on the assumption that users will share data with other, regardless
of their direct benefit. In larger systems, we can observe how freeloaders appear [11] on
the environment. Freeloaders are users that leach resources from the network without
making any contribution. It turns out that we can model such scenarios using game
theory [12] or evolutionary game theory [13, 14] in order to provide tools that enhances
the collaboration between users and avoiding freeloaders. These techniques have proved
be effective in real peer-to-peer protocols like BitTorrent [15].
The last example, peer-to-peer protocols, puts emphasis in one of the more promising
fields in computer science: distributed systems. Distributed systems, as we have said,
try to solve the need for improving the resilience and accessibility of data. Take for
instance databases, they have to deal with an immense amount of data, which grows
every day. At the same time, they have to maintain an efficient throughput to resolve
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the petitions of millions of users. Because of the possible wide distribution of data, the
problem of data replication can be seen as a non-cooperative game [16, 17]. It turns,
out that this problem could be explained in terms of The Tragedy of the Commons [18]
game, a famous conundrum in game theory literature. Thus, many of the game-theory
technics could be used to increase the performance of distributed systems.
These are good examples of the application of game theory to computer science. How-
ever, are game theory applied in Artificial Intelligence field? When I started the master,
Professor Moreno taught us about multiagent systems. He told us that there are many
situation where agents have to negotiate between them in order to get a service or
coordinate a collective action [19]. Game theory can play its role in this kind of scenar-
ios [20]. Some examples can be found in the literature. If we think in situations where
planes from different airlines have to share a limited airport resource, some mechanisms
to prioritize the petitions has to be proposed [21]. In electronic market, where agents
have the objective of buy and sell resources game theory enhances the selection of the
best strategy [22–25]. As a final example, we can consider a situation where an agent
has to schedule meetings on behalf of people whom they work, that could lead to some
conflicts that has to be resolved in an intelligent way [26].
Well thats from the point of view of game theory: What happens with networks? The
study of networks, their properties and dynamics, has experimented a huge advance in
the last few decades, empowered by the technological advances that enable the acqui-
sition of real data about interactions between individuals from social networks [27, 28],
mobile communication networks [29] or collaborations between scientific authors [30].
The analysis of network dynamics arises the question of how cooperation evolves in such
a context [31]. There is a vast literature on the subject, studding aspects ranging from
the effect of network topology on cooperation [32] to network growth driven by cooper-
ation dynamics[33, 34], and other spatial and temporal effects [35] that offer insights on
how cooperation can evolve and survive in different scenarios.
I focused my research in multiplex networks, an innovative way of representing multiple
types of social interactions in one single structure [36, 37], which have been already
successfully applied to the study of disease spreading [38] and synchronization dynam-
ics [39]. Multiplex networks are interesting in this field, because many social interactions
can be understood as a superposition of interactions at different independent levels, each
one representing a different social scenario like family, friends, coworkers, etc. An in-
dividual’s behaviour can be different in each level; however, it is conditioned by all of
them [40, 41]. How the evolution of cooperation works on top of this multilayered struc-
ture remains an open question. There are several works that explore the problem on
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coupled networks, or the effect of degree correlation among layers or the dynamics over
a particular dilemma.
1.2 Goals
The study of how evolutionary game theory works in a multiplex environment is the
primary goal of this work. In order to achieve it, we have to examine several aspects
never investigated before. The first one is the study of resilience and propagation of
cooperation in the four possible stabilities in games of two strategies, depending on
the initial fraction of cooperators in the system. That is, maybe, the most common
results when one analyzes games in networks. However, there are no previous result in
multilayer systems.
The second important step is tray to study the microscopic behavior of the players
across layers. That is an important goal because nobody has never looked at it, and
give information about the coherence of players when they choose the strategies, and
try to ask questions like: Do the players choose the same strategies in all the layers?
Which are the implications that the players do not do it?
Evolutionary means that the population evolve through time. Time needed to reach
a stable equilibrium. The addition of layers to a multiplex network could lead to an
increase in the time required by the system to converge. Usually, the studies on this
field do not take into account that factor, we have considered that it is worth to study
it.
When the system arrives at the stationary equilibrium, some fluctuation could appear
due the finite size of the environment. That is especially true in anti-coordination
games, like the Chicken, where an equilibrium where defector and cooperators players
have to coexist. If one player changes at some point that could lead to a cascading
effect of changes in the environment. That would make the system oscillate around the
equilibrium. We have to define a measure in order to study that effect and investigate
which are the implications of use a multiplex network.
These are the main objectives of this work. However, my work does not stop here. Cur-
rently, I am doing my Ph.D. in the same area. Thus, as an addition to the previous goals,
we could add a transversal one: provide the tools and measures to study evolutionary
game theory in multiplex networks.
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1.3 Organization
The following document is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we will discuss the
background required to understand the concepts presented in this work: game theory,
evolutionary game theory, the four main equilibriums in games with two strategies and,
finally, we will expose some proposed mechanisms that could enhance the survival rate
or cooperators in hostile environments.
In Chapter 3, we will explain the main concepts in network theory, and we will introduce
a brand new way of representing information, multiplex networks. We will also introduce
the game dynamics in networks and some previous results found in the literature.
The Chapter 4 is devoted to describing the details and methodology of the conducted
experiment, and the results obtained regarding: the density of cooperators, coherent
players (a new measure never used before), the dependence to the initial fraction of
cooperators, how the convergence is modified by the addition of layers to a multiplex
structure, and finally the influence of the multilayer architecture over fluctuations, an-
other new measure never explored before.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we will discuss some conclusions about the results and what are
the possible implications of this results regarding the explanation about the survival of
cooperation. Future work related with the results obtained in this thesis will also be
explained in this chapter.
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we will discuss the background required to understand the concepts
presented in this work. We will start, Section 2.1, explaining the origin of Game theory,
how a game is represented and, finally, a fundamental concept of Game theory: the Nash
equilibria. Following that section, we will expose the key concepts of Evolutionary Game
theory, Section 2.2, an evolutive approach to classical game theory and we will describe
the four possible equilibriums in games of two strategies. Finally, we will discuss the
five mechanisms described by Nowak [42] the enhances cooperation.
2.1 Classical Game Theory
Game theory is a field that study the decision making process when the final output
not just depend on the choice of one decision maker, but also depends on the choices
realized by other people. In this section, a brief description of the main concepts and
models used in this field will be given.
2.1.1 Game representation
Before entering in further details of game theory, some concepts about the representation
of such games has to be introduced. There are two main kinds of game representations:
the strategic or normal for and the extensive form. In this research work we will focus
on the strategic normal form so we will briefly describe how it works in the following
paragraphs.
Probably the most common way of representing a game is with the strategic or normal
form. There are some requirements to represent a game using this form. First we need
6
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a set of players that will play the game, N, for each player i P N exist a nonempty set
of alternative strategies that he can play, Ci. Finally, the utility functions have to be
specified according to: @i P N Dui | ui : ŚjPN Cj Ñ R. So a game Γ is formal defined
as [43]:
Γ “ pN, pCiqiPN , puiqiPN q (2.1)
A game has to fulfill an special requirement in order to be expressed in a normal form:
it is required that the actions of all the players have to be taken simultaneously. That
means that a player has to choose his strategy before he knows the selected strategy
of the other players, so considerations about which preferences the other participants
would prefer are needed in order to select the best strategy.
The normal representation generate a N-dimensional space where all the possible game
resolutions are represented. Each player is represented as a dimension, each dimension
is split in |Ci| sections. The intersection of these sections in the N-dimensional space
creates a grid, and in each grid cell1 there are the outputs that the players will obtain.
Example 2.1. Consider the following problem: David and John share a network con-
nection and both want to download a file from internet. They have two options limit its
bandwidth or don’t do it. If both limit their bandwidth the network will not have a high
level of congestion and they can download the files in 3 hours. If they use does not limit
their bandwidth the level of network congestion will be high and they will need 5 hours to
download the files. If one limit his network and the other does not the one with limited
network will need 7 hours to download the file the other just 1 hour.
It turns out that this problem could be represented as a 2-person cooperation game when
limit the bandwidth means cooperate and use and unlimited network means defection.
According to previously given definition this game could be represented in normal, Ta-
ble 2.1
David
Limited Unlimited
John
Limited 3h, 3h 7h, 1h
Unlimited 1h, 7h 5h, 5h
Table 2.1: Example of a game in normal form
The previous example was an example of a symmetric game. In this kind of games, all
the players will obtain the same payoff for each strategic situation present in the game,
so the payoff matrix, Table 2.1, it could be written as:
1There exists
ś
iPN |Ci| cells
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Opponent
Limited Unlimited
Player
Limited 3h 7h
Unlimited 1h 5h
Table 2.2: Example of a symmetric game in normal, where the player will obtain the given
payoffs when he plays agains a given opponent
2.1.2 Domination
The Dominance Principle where a strategy is strictly better choice than another one. If
the outcomes of a strategy A are at least equal to the outcomes of the strategy B, and
at least better than one outcome, then the strategy A dominates the strategy B. If such
situation exists, a rational and intelligent player should always choose plays the strategy
A.
Opponent
A B
Player
A 4 2
B 1 0
Table 2.3: Example of the domination principle. In this case the strategy A dominates
strategy B so there are no reason to play B
For instance in Table 2.3 we can see how strategy A is better than the strategy in B.
So it has no sense to play B it will always be better choose A whatever your opponent
does. According to that principle, dominated strategies can be eliminated for the set
of possible choices in an iterative way. However, that not solve completely the problem
because some strategies either dominate or are dominated by others. To solve that issue
we have to introduce Nash Equilibrium.
2.1.3 Nash Equilibrium
John Forbes Nash describes in the ’50s perhaps the most important notion about game
theory, the Nash equilibria [44], which is vastly used in many fields from economics
to biology. In essence describes a set of strategies that no player has an interest to
change unilaterally. It is important as we will see because always exist at least one
Nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies, that principle is known as Nash Theorem.
In one hand, pure strategies provide a deterministic view of how a player should play.
Determine the set of strategies that the player has to use to face a given situation. In
the other hand, mixed strategies are stochastic; a set of pure strategies is played with
a given probability. The probabilities are in continuous space, so there are an infinite
number of mixed strategies.
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We will start describing in a formal way how Nash equilibria is defined. Let’s consider
the strategic form representation of Equation (2.1), where N is the number of players,
for each i player exist a set of Ci available strategies, and there are a function ui that
define the set of available payoffs. Now we can define a randomized-strategy profile as
σ, if for each player i and each strategy ci in Ci, the value of σ is a nonnegative real
number σipciq, that represents probability that player i would choose ci.
ÿ
ciPCi
σipciq “ 1 (2.2)
If we have a σ for any player in then the probability tat they choose an strategic profile
c “ pciqi P N can be written as śiPN sigmaipciq. So the expected payoff that player i
would obtain when his opponents choose independently their strategies according to σ
can be described as:
uipσq “
ÿ
cPC
ˆź
jPN
σjpcjq
˙
¨ uipcq (2.3)
Now, suppose that we fix one of the strategies in the randomized set profile, {taui will
represent the fixation of the ith component of σ. The expected payoff then could be
written as:
uipσ´iq, τiq “
ÿ
cPC
ˆ ź
jPN´i
σjpcjq
˙
¨ τipciq ¨ uipciq (2.4)
We have introduced a notation rxs to denote certainty about the payoff obtained by a
player x. Now, we can use this notation to specify rcis as a randomized strategy that
puts probability 1 on the strategy ci. So σi as to be defined as:
σi “
ÿ
ciPCi
σipciqrcis (2.5)
Doing that we can redefine the expected payoff of i as:
uipσ´i, rcisq “
ÿ
c´i inC´i
ˆ ź
jPN´1
σjpcjq
˙
¨ ui, ci (2.6)
However, we have to suppose that all players behave in a rational and intelligent way.
So all players has to choose the strategies that maximize their expected payoff assigning
probability zero to those strategies that does not maximize it:
σipciq ą 0 Ñ ci P arg max
ciPCi
uipσ´i, rcisq (2.7)
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If the Equation (2.7) holds for every i player in the game, and every strategy in ci in Ci
then the randomized profile σ could be considered a Nash equilibrium of the game. And
as we said previously, no player could increase his expected payoff changing unilaterally
his strategy. So, σ is Nash equilibrium of the game if and only iff:
uipσq ě uipσ´i, τiq, @i P N, @τi P Ci (2.8)
If the above inequality is strict, the equilibrium is called Strict Nash Equilibrium. In
this case we can assure that no player has a unilateral incentive to deviate and play
another strategy, it is impossible outperform the current payoff. In Section 2.3 will show
several examples of different Nash Equilibriums.
2.2 Evolutionary approach to Game Theory
In the ’70s, John Maynard Smith and George R. Price introduce [45] Evolutionary Game
Theory as a version of classical game theory that uses concepts of Darwinian natural
selection to model an evolving population of competing strategies. As we will see, this
theory focuses not just in the quality of the strategy; it also depends in its frequency in
the populations.
There are two ways of modeling evolutionary scenarios. The first one is taking the agent
approach and look how each agent in the system evolve through time. That approach
is good when the fluctuations, microscopic dynamics and the topology of the social
neighborhood can be neglected. However, in many situations those requirements do not
need to be fulfilled and a mean-field approach that consider the entire population could
be used. In this section, we will focus on this last approach; an agent based populations
will be explained in the next chapter.
The mean-field approach can be defined by the underlying two-person game. The game
is repeated number of generations and the players in the population after they collect
its payoff can change their strategy according to some update rule. According to Szabo´
et.al. [46], the following simplifying assumptions has to be made:
• The number of boundedly agents is very large
• All agents are equivalent and have identical payoff matrices (are playing a sym-
metric game), or they from two different groups for the two roles (asymmetric
game)
• In each generation agents are randomly matched with equal probability.
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• An update can be based on the average success rate of a strategy.
• All agents use the same strategy update
2.2.1 Replicator Dynamics
Imagine that we have a population of two strategies: A with a frequency xA and B with
a frequency xB. Let’s define the vector ~x “ pxA, xBq as the representation of the current
population. Now we could define fAp~xq and fBp~xq as the fitness of both strategies in
the current environment. Taking that into account, the following differential equations
defines the change in the frequency of each strategy in the next generation:
9xA “ xA ¨ pfAp~xq ´ φq (2.9)
9xB “ xB ¨ pfBp~xq ´ φq (2.10)
Where φ defines the average fitness of the game:
φ “ xA ¨ fAp~x` xB ¨ fBp~xq (2.11)
The population is bonded so xA`xB “ 1. That means that we can express one variable
in terms of the other, in this case xB “ 1 ´ xA. Knowing that, the dynamics of the
network are defined by the following differential equation:
9xA “ xA ¨ p1´ xAq ¨ pfApxAq ´ fBpxAqq (2.12)
That has sense for a simple two strategy game, however a generalization of the dynamic
is needed to cover a game with n strategies. The equation that specifies this behavior
is known as the Replicator equation (Equation (2.13)) introduced by Peter Taylor and
Leo Jonker [47].
9xi “ xi ¨ pfip~xq ´ phip~xqq (2.13)
Where the fitness of i could be computed as:
fip~xq “
nÿ
j“1
aij ¨ xj (2.14)
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aij is the respective entry in column i and row j of the payoff matrix A. The average
fitness φp~xq is described as:
φp~xq “
ÿ
i
fip~xq ¨ xi (2.15)
In order to see how frequency based fitness works, we will example described by Nowak [1]:
Example 2.2. Imagine two phenotypes A and B, Figure 2.1. A can move while B
cannot. A pays a certain cost for the ability to move, but also gains the associated
advantage. Suppose the cost-benefit analysis leads to a fitness of 1.1 for A compared to
a fitness of 1 for B. In this setting, fitness is constant, and A will certainly outcompete
B, Figure 2.1a. But imagine that the advantage of being able to move is larger when few
others are on the road, but diminishes as the highways get blocked up, Figure 2.1b. In
this case, the fitness of A is not constant, but is a declining function of the frequency of
A. A has a higher fitness than B when A is rare, but has a lower fitness than B when A
is common.
B
B
B
B
B
A
B
(a) Low proportion of A
B
A
A
A
A
A
A
(b) High proportion of A
Figure 2.1: Example of how it works the frequency based dynamics in a population. We
have two phenotypes A and B. A has the ability to move and B does not. If few other cells
are moving, then A has a larger fitness than B. But if many other cells are moving, this fitness
advantage is reversed [1]
2.2.2 Evolutionary Stable Strategy
John Maynard Smith uses evolutionary game theory to define an stable equilibrium in
the population when he was unaware of the existence of Nash Equilibria in game theory.
However a relation between the two definitions could be established if we consider that
the fitness in classical game theory is the accumulated payoff of playing against all the
players in the population in an iterative way.
We will start analyzing a symmetric game with just two available strategies defined in
Table 2.4. Following the criteria specified in Section 2.1.3 about Nash equilibria, we
have the following situations:
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A B
A a b
B c d
Table 2.4: Example of a general payoff matrix for a symmetric game with two strategies
• A is a strict Nash equilibrium if a ą c
• A is a Nash equilibrium if a ě c
• B is strict Nash equilibrium if d ą b
• B is a Nash equilibrium if d ě b
John M. Smith, follows a different approach to arrive to a similar situation [45]. Imagine
that we have one population of A, could the introduction of a infinitesimally small, ,
quantity of B invade the entire population? In order to find a situation where the fitness
of A is greater than the fitness of B, the following requirement has to be fulfilled:
ap1´ q ` b ą cp1´ q ` d (2.16)
 is a really small value so we can cancel the terms where it appears. So the previous
equation could be reduced to:
a ą c (2.17)
Nevertheless, if we found that a “ c, then the Equation (2.16) is reduced to:
b ą d (2.18)
So in order to be a evolutionary stable strategy on of this two conditions has to be
fulfilled: pa ą cq _ pa “ c^ b ą dq
When that happens it can be guaranteed that the introduction of B in a population of
A will not invade the entire population.
In order to see which is the relation between Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionary Stable
Strategies, we will explore games with more than two strategies. The payoff for a
strategy Si versus Sj is given by EpSi, Sjq. So we have that a strategy Sk is a strict
Nash Equilibria iff:
EpSk, Skq ą EpSi, Skq @i ‰ k (2.19)
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Sk is a Nash equilibrium if:
EpSk, Skq ě EpSi, Skq @i (2.20)
Finally Sk is a evolutionary stable strategy if one of the following conditions is fulfilled:
EpSk, Skq ą EpSi, Skq @i ‰ k (2.21)
EpSk, Skq “ EpSi, Skq ^ EpSk, Siq ą EpSi, Siq @i ‰ k (2.22)
Observing the last equations, it can be observed how all the strategies that are strict
Nash equilibriums are evolutionary stable strategy too. However that is not true for a
Nash equilibrium. If EpSk, Skq “ EpSj , Skq and EpSk, Sjq ă EpSj , Sjq, Sk is a Nash
equilibrium however it Sk cannot resist against an invasion by Sj . That means that strict
Nash Equilibrium implies evolutionary stable strategy that implies Nash equilibrium but
not vice-versa.
2.3 The four equilibriums
In literature is common to use some conundrums in order to explain some situations
where an individual as to made a decision. In game theory, there are four games that are
commonly used to describe each one of the equilibriums that a game with two strategies
could have. The following general payoff matrix could be seen as a generalization of
cooperative game. We will follow the above nomenclature to explain all the cooperative
situation in the rest of the present work.
Opponent
Cooperation Defection
Player
Cooperation Reward Sucker
Defection Temptation Penalty
Table 2.5: Payoff matrix that describes a generic cooperative game.
2.3.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
[ht!] Imagine that the police arrest two persons accused of the same crime. The police
confine them into two separate cells and make them an offer. They can either betray
his partner (defect) or remain silent (cooperate). If both remain silent, they get a five-
year sentence. If one betray and the other remain silent, the one who betrays goes free
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C                             D
Figure 2.2: Evolutionary dynamics in the prisoners dilemma. It can be observed how the
game has an stable equilibrium in defection strategy
and the other gets a fifteen-year sentence. Finally, if both betray they get a ten-years
sentence.
Opponent
Remain Silent Betray
Player
Remain Silent 5 years 15 years
Betray 0 years 10 years
Table 2.6: Tabular representation of the prisoners dilemma game that specifies all possible
outcomes. In bold we can see the equilibrium of the game.
That is, maybe, the most famous dilemma in game theory [48–50]. It explains a scenario
where the best rational choice is always defect, no matter that a better possible outcome
could be obtained if both subjects cooperate (the Pareto optimal of the game). In terms
of game theory, defection is a pure Nash Equilibria, and in terms of evolutionary game
theory, it is an evolutionary stable equilibria. We will show in Chapter 4 how this is an
essential game to study how cooperation could survive in hostile environments, because
in many real world scenarios it has been observed that when players plays a similar game,
in terms of distributions of payoff, the usual outcome is not always defect. If we put
this game in terms of the Table 2.5, all the matrices that follows the payoff distribution
T ą R ą P ą S are versions of Prisoner’s dilemma.
2.3.2 Harmony
C                             D
Figure 2.3: Evolutionary dynamics in the Harmony Game. It can be observed how the game
has an stable equilibrium in cooperation strategy
Harmony game [51] could be described according to the payoff matrix distribution R ą
S ą P ^ R ą T ą P . This game has a strict Nash Equilibrium that is also an
Evolutionary Stable Strategie, always cooperate. This game is often put apart in the
traditional game theory analysis because it does not represent any conflictive social
dilemma. However, we will see through this work that the dynamics in this game are
quite interesting when it is played in a multiplex structure.
The following payoff matrix describe one example of harmony game:
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Opponent
Cooperate Defect
Player
Cooperate 5 3
Defect 3 0
Table 2.7: Tabular representation of the Harmont game that specifies all possible outcomes.
In bold we can see the equilibrium of the game.
2.3.3 Stag Hunt
C                             D
Figure 2.4: Evolutionary dynamics in the Stag Hunt game. This game has one unstable
equilibrium in mixed strategies and two stable equilibriums in cooperation and defection
Jean-Jacques Rousseau describes the Stag Hunt game [52, 53] as an example of a coor-
dination game. Imagine that two individuals go out to a hunt, each one could choose
between hunt a stag or a hare. A stag has more meat than a hare, however is more
complicated to hunt, it need two persons to be accomplished. However, a hare is smaller
and can be easily hunted by a single person.
For instance, if we suppose that a hunt weights 50 Kg and a hare 3Kg then we could
define the following payoffs resumed in Table 2.8:
• Hunt a stag vs. Hunt a hare: The one that tries to hunt a stag alone fails and
get a payoff of 0. The other one is successful hunting a hare, so he gets a payoff of
3.
• Hunt a hare vs. Hunt a hare: Both hunters catch a hare, so both gets a payoff
of 1.
• Hunt a Stag vs. Hunt a Stag: There are coordination between the two hunters
so they can hunt the Stag getting a payoff of 15.
As we have said, the best strategy in this case chooses the same strategy than the one
that your opponent chooses. This game has two pure Nash equilibriums; one is risk
dominant (hunt a hare), the other one is payoff dominant (hunt a stag).
Opponent
Stag Hare
Player
Stag 15 0
Hare 3 3
Table 2.8: The payoffs obtained in the Stag Hunt game
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In Evolutionary Game Theory terms, the game has an unstable equilibrium in mixed
populations (which depends on the payoff values). And two evolutionary stable equi-
libriums when players plays the same strategy. If we put in terms of the Table 2.5 the
payoff distribution R ą T ą P ą S defines the versions of a Stag-Hunt game.
2.3.4 Hawk-Dove
C                             D
Figure 2.5: Evolutionary dynamics in the Hawk-Dove game. This game has one unstable
equilibrium in mixed strategies and two stable equilibriums in cooperation and defection
John Maynard Smith, father of Evolutionary Game Theory, introduced this game in
the ’70s [54, 55], as a biological approach to the Chicken or Snowdrift game. Imagine
that there is some resource, V , in an environment, and there are some species that are
competing for it. Suppose that species can adopt one of these two behaviours:
• Hawk: escalate and continue until injured or until opponent retreats.
• Dove: display; retreat at once if opponent escalates.
If both individuals escalate, it can be assumed that sooner or later one of the individuals
would get injured, and that has a cost, C. Analysing this situation we could define the
following scenarios:
• Hawk vs. Hawk: Each opponent has a 50% of injuring its contestant and
obtaining the resource. So on average the average payoff of this situation is V´C2 .
• Dove vs. Dove: Two dove will not engage into a fight for the resource, they will
share the resource. As a conclusion, they will receive a payoff of V2 .
• Hawk vs. Dove: A dove will escape when a the hawk comes for the resource in
order to avoid being injured. So the Hawk will obtain all the resources, V, and
the dove 0.
We can see a summary of these payoffs in the table preceding. Usually, the value of C
is bigger than the value of V. Otherwise it will be a version of the Prisoner’s dilemma.
That game is an anti-coordination game where the best outcome is obtained playing the
opposed strategy that the one that your adversary chooses. That means that we have
an evolutionary stable equilibrium with a mixed population.
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Opponent
Hawk Dove
Player
Hawk V´C2 V
Dove 0 V2
Table 2.9: The payoffs obtained in the Hawk-Dove game with values of C ą V .
In terms of Nash Equilibria, the game has three balances. Two pure equilibriums, the
pairs when the players choose opposed strategies; and one mixed equilibrium, when the
players choose probabilistically between the two available strategies. This game, also
known as the Chiken or Snow Drift is described with the following payoff distribution
T ą R ą S ą P according the Table 2.5.
2.3.5 S-T Plane
Traditionally the values of R and P are fixed to R “ 1 and P “ 0 in order to provide a
fixed scale for the game payoffs [56, 57]. Applying this constraint, it turns out that the
selection of the remaining parameters T and S enables the definition of several games
according to their evolutionary stability in a simple plane 2.6. That will be the parameter
space of the experiments conducted in Chapter 4.
Figure 2.6: We can define a plane where all the dynamics are represented as factor of Sucker
and Temptation payoffs
2.4 Five rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
In essence, cooperation means that selfish agents forgot some of their reproductive po-
tential to help one another [42]. However, classic Game Theory and Evolutionary Game
Theory do not explain by their self how, in some situations, cooperative behaviour can
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survive in hostile environments. Martin Nowak introduced five possible mechanisms
that explain the resilience of cooperative behaviours [42].
For notation purposes, suppose that there is some individual that pays a payoff c in
order that other one can get a payoff b. Then we can define the cost-to-benefit ratio as
c{b. That will be useful in order to explain how the following dynamics works.
2.4.1 Kin Selection
The first, and most obvious mechanism, is kin selection. The idea is that the natural
selection can favour cooperation if the donor and the recipient of an altruistic act are
bound by genetic relative ties. For instance, if we are playing the prisoners dilemma
with our son or our wife we, probably, won’t betray them.
Hamilton’s rule [58] define a measure of relatedness r, the probability of sharing a gene.
Taking that into account, we can define the following inequality that defines the condition
needed to cooperate with a relative:
r ą c
b
(2.23)
2.4.2 Direct Reciprocity
Direct reciprocity means that we assume that there are repeated encounters between
players. One of the most famous discoveries in game theory was made by Axelrod [49].
It describes the winning strategy for repeated encounters: the simplest tit-for-tat (if you
have betrayed me in the previous game, I will betray you in the current).
The problem with tit-for-tat strategy is that cannot correct mistakes because an ac-
cidental defection has as a consequence a retaliation dynamic. So the tip-for-tat was
substituted by win-stay, lose-shift. Even simpler than the previous one [59] is based in
repeating your previous move whenever you are doing well, changing otherwise.
If we define w as the probability of a repeated encounter between two individuals, then,
the following inequality defines the requirements to fulfill in order to increase the re-
silience of cooperation:
w ą c
b
(2.24)
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2.4.3 Indirect Reciprocity
Reciprocity does not have to be directed, sometimes we have information about how
our adversary has behaved with others players, a kind of reputation. Some empirical
studies in the field suggest that people who are more helpful are more likely to receive
help from others [60, 61]. Moral and social norms could have their origins in this kind
of reciprocity [62–64].
According to Nowak, the promotion of cooperation could be explained considering the
probability q of knowing the reputation of another player. So the condition that the
system has to fulfill in order to promote cooperation is:
q ą c
b
(2.25)
2.4.4 Group Selection
Not just individuals are affected by selection; groups are affected too. Cooperators in
a cluster could be more profitable than defectors in another one. So imagine that the
population is split into groups. Groups of cooperators that cooperate between them and
obtains a benefit, and defectors that do not help between them.
Let’s consider the following example [65]. Individuals are reproducing according to
their payoff, and the offspring is added to the group where they belong. If the group
reaches a certain size, it can split into two. When that happens, another group has to
become extinct. We have two kinds of selection in this case. In one hand a competition
between groups, the grow ratio of groups is different, so some of them split more often. In
particular, the groups formed just by cooperators tends to grow faster than pure defector
groups. However, defectors in mixed groups tend to reproduce faster than cooperators.
As we have said, we have two level selections: within groups and between groups.
Nowak asserts that if the maximum group size is n and m is the number of groups,
selection will favour evolution of cooperation when the following inequality is satisfied.
b
c
ą 1` n
m
(2.26)
2.4.5 Network Reciprocity
Finally, we have to consider situations where populations are not well-mixed. The players
have some social structure, so they play with some other players a does not with other
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ones. This interaction can be modeled by a network of interactions. As will see in the
next chapter, the topology of the network could have important effects in the evolution
of cooperation.
Imagine the following dynamics, each cooperator has to pay a cost c for each neighbor
in order to receive a benefit, b. In the other hand defectors do not have to pay any cost
and their neighbours doesn’t get any benefit from them. If k is the average number of
neighbors then the following inequality has to be fulfilled in order to obtain cooperator’s
resilience:
b
c
ą k (2.27)
In this work, we will focus in this last mechanism in order to explain cooperation survival.
The next chapter is entirely devoted to describing dynamics in network topologies.
Chapter 3
Networks
A network can be seen as a collection of nodes connected in pairs with other nodes by
edges. That is a simple definition of a network; however the fact that it can represent
relation between entities makes networks really interesting to study things, like social
ties, food webs. . .
In this chapter, Section 3.1, we will give some notions about why is interesting the
study of networks and we will also present some network topologies and descriptors. In
Section 3.1.3, we will introduce a new network structure, the multiplex, which we use
in this work. Finally, in Section 3.2, we will explore games in networks, defining theirs
dynamics and making a review about the current state of the art.
3.1 Introduction to networks
3.1.1 Networks examples
Anything that represents that has a binary relation could be represented with a network
or graph. Network are composed by vertices, which represent entities and edges, which
represent relations between those entities. As it was said, there are an enormous number
of examples in nature. In this section, we will present three of this networks.
The Internet is one of the most important human-made networks, a vast amount of com-
puters connected between them. Inside the Internet, we can found the hugest network
done by humans: the world wide web, Figure 3.1a. Here, each node represents a web
page and the edges between them represent links that point from one page to another
one. In network terms the world wide web is a directed graph, edges have a direction,
the direction of the link in the case of www.
22
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(a) Internet Network (b) Zachary club (c) Food web
Figure 3.1: Three examples of real networks. The first one, 3.1a, is a representation of the
internet network. Figure 3.1b is a representation of the social ties in a karate club [2]. The
last one, 3.1c, represent the Otago Harbour intertidal mudflat food web [3]
We have already said that human friendship ties could be represented using a network,
Figure 3.1b. Maybe, the most reproduced network in the literature is the famous Zachary
Karate Club [2]. Wayne Zachary describes the relation between 34 members of a karate
club at a US university in 1977. At some point, the president and the instructor of the
club decide to split the business in two. Some of the students went with the instructor
and some others with the the president. That is the reason because almost all the
community detection algorithms in graphs are tested with this algorithm.
Finally, we will explain an example of networks in nature, specifically a web food 3.1c.
This specific example shows how is the incorporation of parasites into a food webs; they
focus on the New Zealand lake ecosystems as a model food webs [3].
3.1.2 Network topology
Network topology, how nodes are connected between them, has a huge effect in the
dynamics that run on it. Consider, for instance, that each node in the network is a
person and the edge between them establishes a contact. If one member of the network
gets infected by an infectious disease, his neighbours have some probability to get infected
and transmit the disease. However, the topology of the network, will determine how this
spreading will be [66].
In order to define the properties of the network, first we have to introduce some notions
and descriptors. The first one is the type of edge. Edges can be directed or undirected
depending if there are a directionality in the relation between connected nodes. Take, for
instance, social networks: In one hand, Facebook where the relations between contacts
are undirected; all the people that you follow, also follows you. In the other hand
Twitter, where this symmetry is broken; the people you follow does not have to follow
you back. In that case we have a directed network. Another way to classify edges
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is between weighted and unweighted. Friendship relations could be easily represented
using an unweighted network. However, the network of roads will need a weight in each
edge that represents the distance between geographical locations. In this section, for the
sake of simplicity, we will use unweighted and undirected networks.
There are several ways of representing a network; the usual one is using an adjacency
matrix A. In the case of unweighted networks, the element Aij of the matrix has value
1 if there are an edge between the vertices i and j, and has value 0 otherwise. If the
network is also undirected, that means that the adjacency matrix will be symmetric.
As we have said, we have several metric in order to describe the topology of the network.
One of the most used is the mean degree. The degree of a node is defined as the number
of connections they have. Using the adjacency matrix the degree of a node i could be
computed as:
ki “
nÿ
j“1
Aij (3.1)
Then the mean degree of the network could be computed as:
xky “ 1
n
nÿ
i“1
ki (3.2)
That measure talks in some measure about the sparsity of the network. However, it
does not provide any information about how the edges are distributed among the nodes.
The degree distribution is characterizing factor of the network topology. In the following
two subsections, we will discuss one of the most used degree distributions in network
research.
3.1.2.1 Random networks
In the ’50s Paul Erdo˝s and Alfre´d Re´nyi [67] introduce a way to generate networks where
each node has uniform probability to be connected two any other node. The networks
generated with this model are very useful, for instance, could be used to provide a
definition of what it means for property to hold for almost all graphs.
If we have a network with n nodes then, we can define an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph defining p
as the probability that two nodes are connected. Thus, the average number of edges in
that network will be
`
n
2
˘
p and the probability that a given node has a given degree k is
binomial:
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P pX “ kq “
ˆ
n´ 1
k
˙
¨ pk ¨ p1´ pqpn´ 1´ kq (3.3)
If the number of nodes in the network is large and the factor np is constant, the above
equation could be approximated using a Poisson distribution, Equation (3.4), that give
us some versatility when we try to model complex scenarios, as we will see in the Sec-
tion 4.3.1
P pX “ kq9pnpq
k ¨ e´np
k!
(3.4)
One of the interesting things about this kind of networks is that there no have any
degree correlation that means that the degree of a node is independent of the degree of
his neighbours. That is very interesting because it enables us to reduce the complexity
of the model. We have chosen this kind of networks to realize this job precisely by this
last property.
3.1.2.2 Scale-free networks
For the sake of completeness, we have to talk about one of the degree distribution models,
the scale-free graphs. In this case the degree of the nodes has large fluctuations. In strict
sense, in order to be a scale-free, the degree k, the number of nodes per neighbour, has
to be drawn from a power law distribution:
P pX “ kq9k´γ (3.5)
It has been observed that many real-world networks follow this distribution [68], e.g.,
the internet, the network of acquaintance, collaborations, metabolic reactions... The
particularity of this kind of networks is that γ P p2, 3s. Thus, the degree distribution has
a long tail, meaning that we will have a very heterogeneous degree distribution: many
nodes with few connections and a few ones with very high degree, usually called hubs.
Several methods are proposed to explain the growth procedure of this kind of networks,
maybe the most famous was the one proposed by Baraba´si and Albert [68], the pref-
erential attachment. A node with m links is added at each step to the system, those
links are attached preferentially to those nodes that have large degrees already. That is
known as the ”rich-gets-richer” phenomenon and the probability to attach a link to an
existing node x is:
Πx “ kxř
i“1 ki
(3.6)
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From the previous equation, one can see how in this case there exist a correlation between
the degree of one node and the degree of the neighbours. That fact has huge implications
in the dynamics that run over the network. Consider an infectious disease spreading. If
a hub node gets infected the effects on the network could be catastrophic, because the
number of possible infections is huge.
3.1.3 Multiplex networks
Networks could describe many situations that represent relations between entities. How-
ever, their simplicity could hide more complex relational behaviours. Recently, a new
mathematical paradigm has been proposed in order to model, and analyse context where
the objects exhibit different relationships simultaneously splitting them into different
layers. The resultant architecture is a multilayer system that can represent much richer
information than using the traditional ’monolayer’ network. That enables the study of
the properties of the network in a more precise way [4].
Figure 3.2: Representation of a multiplex network where all the nodes are represented in all
the layers and just links that connect nodes in different layers are allowed as interlayer edges
Multiplex networks are a particular case of this kind of systems. All the entities in a
multiplex have to be represented in all the layers, and the interlayers links that connect
layers are restricted to those that connect the same objects in different layers. We kind
find many examples of multiplex, take, for instance, the network of aeroplane routes. The
nodes of the network are the airports and the connections between them are commercial
air routes. We can represent all that in a ’monoplex’ network with one single layer.
However, if we represent it in a multiplex structure where each layer is the routes of a
specific airline we would have more representative power, Figure3.3a.
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(a) Transportation network
(b) Biological network
Figure 3.3: Two examples of multilayer networks [4]. The Figure 3.3a is an example of a
transportation network, each node is an airport and each layer represents the routes of one
given airline. The Figure 3.3b represents the multilayer network of genetic interactions for the
virus HIV-1
In order to describe mathematically a multilayer network, we have to use a version of
the previously introduced adjacency matrix called supra-adjacency matrix [69], A¯.
A¯ “
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˝
A1 C1,2 ¨ ¨ ¨ C1,j
C2,1 A2 ¨ ¨ ¨ C2,j
...
...
. . .
...
Ci,1 Ci,2 ¨ ¨ ¨ Ai
‹˛‹‹‹‹‚ (3.7)
Where Ai is the adjacency matrix of the ith layers and Cij represent the interlinks
between the layers i and j. There are other commonly used representations of multilayer
networks, like tensorial representation. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, we will
not provide its insights.
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Multiplex structure has an enormous impact in the process that run on top of it, for
instance, in spreading processes [38] or synchronization [39]. That is the main reason
why we will focus on this kind of networks in this work, in order to see how evolutionary
dynamics acts in such scenarios.
3.2 Games in networks
In Section 2.2, we have seen how we can define the evolutionary dynamics at population
level using a mean-field approach, i.e, assuming that all players plays against all the other
players and the number of players is very large. However, as we have seen in this chapter
the social structure of interactions could have a significant impact on dynamics. If we
have a network of interactions and a finite size of the system, we cannot use population
approach for studying how the process works, we have to use agent-level dynamics.
These dynamics are usually described using strategy update rules, which describe how
the agents perceive their environment, what information is necessary to evaluate their
performance and the performance of their acquaintances, which are their expectations
they form from former experience and, finally, how they use all that information in order
to update their strategy. This strategy can mimic rational human learning or maybe
be inspired by Darwinian natural selection. In this section, we will present several
evolutionary dynamics, Section 3.2.1, and several will make a briefly some of the more
significant results about games in networks, Section 3.2.2.
3.2.1 Dynamics
As we have said, there are an enormous variety of microscopic update rules in the
literature, and the choice of which one to use depends on the particular problem that
we are trying to solve. However, almost all the related work takes into account as a
measure of the fitness of one individual his payoff. It could be the current payoff, the
accumulated payoff over rounds, or maybe the prediction about the future payoff. For
our purposes, we will assume that agents evaluate their fitness and the fitness of their
neighbours looking just at the payoff obtained in the current round.
The round steps are always the same: first we calculate the fitness of the agents as an
accumulated payoff received for playing against their neighbours and then, the agents
have the opportunity to update their strategy. However, there are two ways of doing
that:
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• Synchronous: All the agents compute their accumulated payoffs and then update
their strategies at the same time step. This kind of update is applied, for instance,
in biological models, when generations are clearly discernible in time [46].
• Random sequential update: players update their strategy independently of
each other. One possible way of doing that is at each time step choose an agent at
random and compute their current payoff and perform a strategy update. Thus,
the chances that a given agent is selected for update are given by λ “ 1N . We
can also implement a Poisson clock inside each agent that makes the agent update
their strategy at rate λ following a Poisson process.
The following part of this section will be devoted to explaining the main classes of update
rules used in the field. We will start with imitation rules a broad class of microscopic
update rules. The essence of the imitation is that the agent who can revise his strategy
take into account the strategy of one his acquaintances with some probability. It has
to be said that these rules are non-innovative that means that cannot introduce a new
strategy that is not played in the population. The methods that belong to this class of
update rule differs in two aspects: whom to imitate and with what probability.
We will start with a simpler deterministic rule, Unconditional Imitation. This rule works
as follows: the player that has the option to update his payoff looks at their neighbors
and chooses the one with higher payoff. If this neighbour has higher payoff than him
then, the agent will change his strategy by the one that his neighbour use. This very
simplistic rule could work in many situations; however, it has the risk to converge to
fast to a non-optimal solution [46].
The most important rule to our purpose that we have to explain is the proportional
imitation rule, also known as the replicator rule. This rule is inspired in the replicator
dynamics explained in Section 2.2.1 because for large size of population, the evolution
of the dynamics is equal to a time scale factor, to that of replicator dynamics [35]. This
rule has an explicit stochastic component and works as follows. Imagine that we have
N agents. Let be si the strategy of player i, Wi his payoff and Ni her neighbourhood
with ki neighbors. With uniform probability, one agent j of his ki neighbours is selected.
The probability that player i adopts the strategy of player j is given by the following
equation.
P pstj Ñ st`1i q “
$&%
W tj´W ti
Φ : W
t
j ąW ti
0 : W tj ďW ti
(3.8)
Where Φ is a normalizing factor that has to ensure that probability goes between 0 and
1. We will see more details of this factor in the following chapter, when we explain how
we use this rule in our model.
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The next rule that is worth to mention is Moran update rule inspired in the dynamic
update rule for asexual replication [70]. At each time step, one individual is chosen
for reproduction with a probability proportional to its fitness. An identical offspring is
produced, which will replace another individual. That is for fully-connected populations,
however when the individuals are connected in a network the process is a bit different.
From the set of a node and its neighbours one is selected proportionally to its fitness.
The node then will change its strategy for the one that uses the selected one. Notice
that with this rule a player can adopt, with low probability, the strategy of a neighbor
that has done worse than himself.
Finally we will comment one rule that is widely used in the literature, because of being
analytically tractable. It is based on the Fermi distribution functions [35] and is known as
the Fermi rule. A neighbour j of player i is selected at random with uniform probability.
the probability that player i acquire the strategy of player j is given by the following
equation:
P pstj Ñ st`1i q “
1
1` e´β¨pW tj´W ti q (3.9)
Where W tj and W
t
i are the payoffs of node j and i. The parameter β controls the
intensity of selection, and can be understood as the inverse of temperature or noise in
the update rule [35]. If parameter β is low weak selection pressure is applied, if is high
the selection pressure will be more discriminant.
3.2.2 Previous results
Almost all the previous work in the field of games in networks has been done in the last
two decades. In general, authors are focused in two things: how the structure of the
network will impact in the evolution of cooperation and how the game dynamics will
influence the structure of the network. We will follow this scheme in order to explain
the most relevant works in the field. We will start looking how structure of the network
condition the behaviour of players.
One of the first articles that make reference to the consequences of spatial structure
was [56] by Nowak and May published in 1992. They use a lattice, a bidimensional
array, where agents plays against players in the adjacent cells. They discover that if
they set all players to use cooperation, and strategically change to defection few of them
in a particular position that will lead to the generation of kaleidoscopic patterns in
the resultant population. However, lattices are not very useful to represent real-world
scenarios, we need to look how the dynamics work in complex structures.
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Santos and Pacheco publish one of the first works citeSantos:2005ur about game theory in
complex networks in 2005. They arrive at the conclusion that in Prisoner’s Dilemma and
Hawk-Dove games the use of networks generated via growth and preferential attachment
leads to a dynamic where cooperation becomes the dominating trait. They assert that
the reason of such emergence is in the correlation between individuals. Those results
are extended in [71] where the authors evaluate the resilience of cooperation each one of
the four equilibriums of games of two strategies.
The results obtained for scale-free networks are extended to more heterogeneous net-
works in papers like [32] and specially [35], where the authors check the dynamics for a
several kinds of network structure, update rules and initial conditions. In [72] Poncela
et al. discuss the how cooperation is affected by the heterogeneity of the network. They
used a mechanism described by Gomez et al. [73] to generate network with a mixed
degree of heterogeneity, between a random network and scale-free, and they arrive at
the same conclusion: heterogeneity enhances cooperation.
All that results are for spatial macroscopic descriptors of the network as the degree
distribution. Nevertheless, the microscopic structure of the network also could lead
to significant changes in the way how cooperation evolves. The study of features like
how agents changes strategies through time are quite interesting. Poncela and Go´mez
[72, 73] check those features arriving at the conclusion that there are mainly three types
of agents, mixed players (players that change their strategy as the evolutionary process
runs), pure defectors and pure cooperators (players that never change their strategy).
The organization of these agents is worthy because always exist a boundary of mixed
players between pure cooperators and pure defectors. At the mesoscopic level, the com-
munity structure of the netowork present in many real social networks, has demonstrated
to be important in the preservation of cooperation [74] under heavy temptation to defect
conditions.
As we have said, structure modifies the game dynamics but dynamics can also modify
structure. There are several papers related to this subject however two of the most
cited are from Poncela [33, 34] they propose an evolutionary version of the preferential
attachment model in order to grow a network where its main feature being that the
capacity of a node to attract new links depends on a dynamical variable governed in turn
by the node interactions. It turns out that the resultant network shows many features
of real systems: scale-free degree distribution, hierarchical clustering and cooperative
behavior.
In the field of multiplex networks there are few results, two of them has to be mentioned.
The first is from Go´mez et al. [40], it is the one that inspired this present work. In that
paper the authors study how the cooperation evolve in multiplex networks when the
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agents are playing the weak Prisoner’s dilemma. They show how cooperation could be
enhanced by the use of multilayer structures. The second one is from Wang et al. [41]
where the authors use two layers one for compute the payoffs and one for update the
strategies. They discover that if there are mixing in the correlation between two layers
the cooperation gets severely damaged.
Chapter 4
Results
In this chapter, we will present the experimental methodology used to analyze several
aspects, never studied previously, of how evolutionary game theory works in multiplex
networks, and the results obtained. We will start presenting model (Section 4.1) and
the experimental setup, Section 4.2, with an explanation of all the parameters used.
Then, we will focus in the study of several aspects that can help us to understand
the underlying dynamics of the evolutionary process. We will start studying how the
addition of layers to a multiplex structure affects the density of collaborators, Section 4.3.
Then, Section 4.4, we will introduce the concepts of coherent and mixed player behaviour,
a novel descriptor that enables us to study how homogeneous are the strategies played
by agents. Convergence toward a stationary point, Section 4.5, and finally, how are the
fluctuations around the stationary for each network configuration, Section 4.6, are the
last aspects analyzed, in this chapter.
4.1 Model
In our model, the players sit on the nodes of a multiplex network of L layers. Each node is
present in all layers, but they have different connectivity in each layer, in general. Every
layer, li, in the multiplex network is a connected and homogeneous Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER)
network, with the same number of edges E and nodes N , and equal degree distribution,
and the multiplex network is generated avoiding degree correlations between layers.
Each layer is represented by an adjacency matrix Al, where Alij “ 1 if nodes i and j
are connected in that layer, and Alij “ 0 otherwise. That representation enables the
definition of the degree of node i in layer l as kli “
řN
j“1Alij and its global degree in the
multiplex as Ki “ řLl“1 kli.
33
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Figure 4.1: Example of a multiplex network with 3 layers, 5 nodes per layer and 5 links
in each layer. The color of the nodes represents the strategy played in that layer (red for
cooperators, blue for defectors. Their size is proportional to their global payoff.
Each round of the game is divided in two phases: payoff recollection and strategy update.
Each node i can choose to play one of the two strategies, cooperation or defection,
independently so in each layer of the network at every time step, sliptq. Within a specific
payoff matrix, the node i’s strategy determines the payoff, pli, that it obtains in a layer
l when it plays against all its kli neighbors. The total payoff of node i can be easily
calculated as Pi “ řLl“0 pli. At the end of each round, each player can change the
strategy in one of its layers, sli, using the Replicator-like Rule: A node chooses a layer
of the multiplex, lr, with uniform probability. Then it chooses with uniform probability
one of its klri neighbors,jr, in that layer. If Pi ă Pjr and sli ‰ sljr the probability that
node i changes its strategy in layer lr is given by equation:
lrź
iÑjr
ptq “ Pjrptq ´ Piptq
maxpKi,Kjrq ¨ pmaxp1, T q ´minp0, Sqq (4.1)
It is important to noticed that the update rule uses global information about the players:
global degree and global payoff (that is, added up over all layers), in order to update the
strategy of any particular layer. That is the way our model shares information between
layers and relies in the social nature of layers’ interdependency [40]: Each player only
has information about the strategy of its neighbour in their same layer (but not in those
layers where they are not connected). However, it knows its neighbor’s total benefits,
and it makes the simplifying assumption that it is using the same strategy in every layer.
As we will see later on, this fact has a profound impact on the outcomes of the dynamics,
compare to the monoplex scenario.
At the end of each time step the density of cooperators can be computed for each layer
and for the entire multiplex using equation (4.2).
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cptq “ 1
L
Lÿ
l“1
clptq “ 1
L ¨N
Lÿ
l“1
Nÿ
i“1
sliptq (4.2)
4.2 Experimental setup
The results are obtained for a range of values of temptation, T P r0, 2s, and sucker,
S P r´1, 1s, that defines the T ´ S plane as we have explained in Section 2.3.5 and
represented in Figure 2.6. The simulation runs on a multiplex networks (L “ 1, L “ 5,
L “ 10) that has N “ 1000 nodes and E “ 3000 edges per layer. That means that,
on average, the number of adversaries that a node has are three, so the final network
will be sparse. We have observed experimentally that this sparsity intensify the effect of
adding layers. For instance, the difference between the plane obtained for the monoplex
and a multiplex of five layers will be bigger using an average node degree of 3 that using
an average node degree of 20. That happens because sparse ER networks enhances
the formation of cooperators clusters that are more robust against invasion by defector
nodes.
For each possible pair of values of the game parameters the simulation runs 1ˆ105 time
steps, that is the transient time t0 needed by the algorithm to generally reach a stationary
state (we will discuss this further in Section 4.5). After this time the algorithm runs
for another tγ “ 2ˆ 105 time steps more in order to minimize the effect of fluctuations
around the stationary. All the quantities of interest are averaged over this second period
of time. The experiments are repeated and averaged over I “ 64 different networks and
initializations in order to gain statistical confidence. The initial fraction of cooperators
c0 has been fixed to 0.5 in all the realizations.
In order to perform comparisons between the results obtained for each network, we will
perform a two-tailed non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test with a confidence of 95%
over the average measure in each quadrant of the plane.
4.3 Density of cooperators
The stationary average value of cooperation is defined according to the following equa-
tion:
xcy “ 1
tγ ¨ I ¨
Iÿ
i“1
t0`tγÿ
t“t0
cptqi (4.3)
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Figure 4.2: Asymptotic density of cooperators xcy for networks with different number of
layers (L “ 1 in the left column, L “ 5 in the central column, L “ 10 in the right column),
and different initial fraction of cooperation (c0 “ 0.25 in the top row, c0 “ 0.5 in the central
row, c0 “ 0.75 in the bottom row). The plane T ´ S is divided into four major regions that
correspond to the four games under study: the upper-left area is the Harmony Game, the
upper-right is the Hawk Dove, Stag-Hunt is in the lower-left, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma is
in the lower-right. The average asymptotic density of cooperators for each one of the games
is also indicated, as a numerical value, next to the corresponding quadrant.
In the central row of Figure 4.2 we present the average, stationary value of coopera-
tion when c0 “ 0.5 (the other rows correspond to other values of the initial fraction of
cooperators, see the corresponding subsection below, Section 4.3.2). We observe that
our results for the monoplex case (left column) are consistent with those obtained by
Roca et al. [35] for this kind of networks. The previously unreported results for multi-
plex networks show a large increase of the areas where both strategies coexist (that is,
the areas in the plane that separate total cooperation from total defection). However,
this coexistence is of a different nature depending on the evolutionary stability of the
particular game (or quadrant), as we explain bellow.
The Stag Hunt game has an unstable evolutionary equilibrium with mixed populations.
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This means that, when there is a structure, the population will evolve towards total co-
operation or total defection depending on the initial population and type of structure of
the network (due to this fact, the standard error of the xcy is large in that transition area,
Figure 4.3). For the monoplex we have a very narrow transition area between total co-
operation or defection populations (central row, left panel in Figure 4.2). This transition
region widens with the number of layers, enabling the coexistent of both strategies in a
larger portion of the game parameter space. The explanation of such behaviour can be
found in the inter-layer dynamics: it is more likely that a cooperator or a defector node
resists in hostile environments in a particular layer, because its fitness is not evaluated
in just that layer, but also in the other layers where, due its strategy or its topological
configuration, the node might have better performance. The Stag Hunt game, where
the maximum payoff possible is obtained when a cooperator plays against another co-
operator, favors specially the resilience of cooperators nodes when the temptation value
is low: a cooperator node i in layer lr that has a big payoff Pi has higher probability of
spreading its strategy to its defector neighbours in lr, thus increasing its payoff. This
increase will propagate to the other layers, making the strategies of the player more
robust against invasion. Playing defection in layer lr when temptation value is small,
does not have a big effect in the global payoff of the node. As a consequence, in this
particular game the multiplex structure increases specially the resilience of cooperators,
thus the average density of cooperators in this game quadrant shows an statistically
significant increase as we keep adding layers to the structure, according to the statistical
method detailed in the section above.
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Figure 4.3: The standard error computed as σ?
n
for the average of density of cooperators
(c0 “ 0.5), where σ is the standard deviation of the average and n is the number of repetitions
of the simulation, 50.
In the Prisoner’s dilemma game, defection dominates cooperation. Related papers [35]
show that for ER networks using Replicator rule when temptation and sucker payoffs
are not too large, cooperation can survive forming groups of cooperative clusters, thus
resisting against the initial attempt of invasion by defectors, and then spread through the
population. Our results for the monoplex are consistent with those. For the multiplex,
we observe how the transition region between all-cooperator and all-defector situations is
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larger than for the monoplex, as in the case of Stag Hunt game. It is worth noticing that
regions where we have all-cooperator populations in the monoplex, are not necessarily
all-cooperator areas in its multiplex counterpart. This happens because the formation
of cooperative clusters in one layer will also enforce the fitness of these nodes in the
other layers regardless of the strategy used in these other layers. And this can lead to
an enforcement of defector strategies due to the inter-layer dynamics, increasing their
survival rate. This inter-layer dynamics will led to a widening of the transition area
that enables survival of cooperators in areas where they are no present in the monoplex
scenario. If we take into account the whole Prisoner’s Dilemma quadrant, the conclusions
are the same that in the Stag Hunt game: a statistically significant increase in the average
density of cooperators occurs as we increase the number of layers.
The Hawk Dove game has a stable equilibrium in mixed populations: it is an anti-
coordination game. Previous works [35] show that for ER networks there are some
regions in the plane T-S for which this game converges to single-strategy populations.
For lower values of the temptation these regions are prone to cooperation. In multiplex
networks however, single strategy regions are less common and mixed populations are
the rule. That happens by the same inter-layer dynamics that we have explained earlier:
the impact of the a cooperator’s benefits in one layer, on the other layers of the multiplex
structure. This entails a significant reduction on the average fraction of cooperators from
0.734 in the monoplex to 0.661 in the 10-layer multiplex for this quadrant.
Finally, the Harmony game has cooperation as its dominant strategy. For a single-layer
ER networks with Replicator update rule, Roca et al. [35] report that the whole quadrant
ends up in an all-cooperator configuration. In the case of multiplex scenarios however,
the average fraction of cooperators decreases significantly as we keep adding layers to
the system: 0.932 for L “ 5 and 0.910 for L “ 10. This increasing resilience of defection
can be explained as a consequence of the multiplex topology and the lack of degree
correlations between layers: due to the payoff accumulated by an individual acting as
cooperator in some layers, defector nodes can resist against cooperators in other layers.
In Section 4.3.1, we will prove mathematically how that can happens.
4.3.1 Survival of defectors in a Multiplex Harmony Game
We can mathematically prove that defectors can survive and be stable in the Harmony
game on ER multiplex networks by analyzing the simplest situation, Figure 4.4: let’s
assume a multiplex structure with L layers. In one single layer (for simplicity we assume
it will be the first one) we have one single node playing as defector, but it plays as
cooperator in all the other L ´ 1 layers. There are no more defectors anywhere in the
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Figure 4.4: An example of a defector that is able to survive in a hostile environment due the
multiplex interlayer dynamics.
system. This node’s connectivity in layer α is kα, and, recalling that R “ 1 and P “ 0,
the total payoff of that node that is defecting in one single layer is given by:
Pd “ Tk1 `
Lÿ
α“2
kα (4.4)
The payoff of any of the node’s neighbors (note that all of them play as cooperators),
with a degree k1α in layer α, is:
Pc “ pk11 ´ 1q ` S `
Lÿ
α“2
k1α “
Lÿ
j“1
k1α ` S ´ 1 (4.5)
Thus, in order to survive as a defector in layer α, the following inequality must be
fulfilled for each of the node’s neighbours:
Pd ě Pc (4.6)
Tk1 `
Lÿ
i“2
ki ě
Lÿ
j“1
k1j ` S ´ 1 (4.7)
We can estimate both a soft and a hard limit for the previous inequality. As a soft limit,
and assuming we have independent, uncorrelated Erdo¨s-Re´nyi layers in our multiplex
network, we can approximate every kα by ă k ą and get:
pT ` L´ 1qxky ě S ´ 1` Lxky (4.8)
xky ě S ´ 1
T ´ 1 (4.9)
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On the other hand, a hard limit for the condition can be calculated by approximating
ki by kmax for the cooperator neighbours:
pT ` L´ 1qxky ě S ´ 1` Lxkmaxy (4.10)
xky ě S ´ 1` Lxkmaxy
T ` L´ 1 (4.11)
On the other hand, we can calculate the probability of this topological situation happen-
ing. First of all we have to define what is the probability of a node i to have degree k,
P pX “ kq. In our model, and in order to avoid the non-negligible effect of unconnected
nodes, we impose a minimum connectivity, kmin. To get a more accurate approximation
of our degree distribution we take into account this minimum:
PkminpX “ kq “
P pX “ kq
1´ P pX ď kminq (4.12)
As it has been stated previously, the payoff of cooperators against cooperators is propor-
tional to their degree, because we set R “ 1: in this example we use L´1 full cooperative
layers so the payoff obtained in this layers is proportional to the degree distribution of
the aggregate network of this L´1 layers. Moreover, the payoff distribution of the nodes
that play cooperation in all layers is proportional to the node’s degree in an aggregation
of all layers, L. Imposing that we do not have inter-layer degree correlation, the degree
distribution of the aggregated networks can be modeled using the convolution of the
single layer degree distributions.
PL´1 „ Pkmin ˚
L´ 1lomon
¨ ¨ ¨ ˚ Pkmin (4.13)
PL „ Pkmin ˚
Llomon
¨ ¨ ¨ ˚ Pkmin (4.14)
The probability that a topological configuration that enables the fulfillment of the payoff
conditions specified by the equation (4.7) exists, is given by the equation (4.15), where q
is the payoff obtained by the defector node playing as a cooperator in L´1 layers. With
that information, an upper bound for the aggregated degree of the defector’s neighbours
can be defined as tq`k1 ¨T ´S`1u, and if all the neighbours have an aggregated degree
below this upper bound, the defector can survive. It is worth noticing that the upper
bound for the degree of a cooperator is a discretization of payoff values that involve
S and T . This means that the survival probability of a defector only changes when
the relation between S and T changes by an amount large enough. It turns out that
this probability is bigger as more layers we add to our system (as will see in the above
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sections) and gets smaller if we increase the mean degree xky of the network.
8ÿ
k1“kmin
PkminpX “ k1q
8ÿ
q“kmin¨L
PL´1pX “ qq ¨ PLpX ď tq ` k1 ¨ T ´ S ` 1uqk1 (4.15)
We next present the expression for the degree distribution probability function, assuming
that we have a restriction for the minimum degree, and that the network is an Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi, so we can use a Poisson distribution to construct the probability function (4.16).
PkminpX “ kq “
λk ¨ e´λ
k! ¨ p1´ e´λ ¨řtkminui“0 λii! q (4.16)
4.3.2 Initial fraction of cooperators
For completeness, in Figure 4.2 we show the stationary average fraction of cooperation for
the four-game plane and various numbers of layers, for three different initial fractions
of cooperators (upper row is c0 “ 0.25, middle row is c0 “ 0.5 and bottom row is
c0 “ 0.75). We will briefly discuss now the differences between the previously explained
case of c0 “ 0.5, and the other two scenarios.
We observe that, for a given game quadrant and a given number of layers, increasing
the initial fraction of cooperation has in general a positive but moderate impact on the
stationary fraction of cooperation, specially in the Stag Hunt and Prisoner’s Dilemma
games. In the former one, we have an unstable evolutionary equilibrium in mixed pop-
ulations, so the change of c0 has a significant impact on the final outcome. In the case
of Prisoner’s dilemma game, an increase in the initial fraction of cooperators means
an increase in the probability that clusters of cooperators forms and that increases the
region where cooperators can survive.
The effect of adding layers to the system still holds or is even emphasized by an increased
initial fraction of cooperators: the overall stationary value of cooperation increases with
the number of layers in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Stag-Hunt, the region of
coexistence between both strategies widens for the Hawk Dove Game, and the Harmony
game presents a smaller decrease using a higher initial number of cooperators in the
multiplex configurations. That could be explained taking into account that the places
that topologically could enhance the defectors survival rate, explained in the section
above, have a higher probability to be occupied by cooperators, hence we can observe a
reduction in their number.
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Figure 4.5: Average density of coherent cooperators (left column), coherent defectors (middle
column) and mixed individuals (right column) for networks with 5 layers (top row) and 10
layers (bottom row). The average density of the corresponding type of individuals is also
provided for each one of the quadrants (upper-left is the Harmony Game, upper-right is the
Hawk Dove , Stag-Hunt is the lower-left, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma in the lower-right).
4.4 Coherent and mixed players
Coherent Cooperation. Prompted by the topological configurations described earlier,
we can now define a ”coherent cooperator” as a node that, at a given instant of time,
plays as cooperator in all L layers of the system. Similarly, we can define a ”coherent
defector” as a node that, at a given instant of time, plays as defector in all L layers
of the system. Finally, those individuals that are neither coherent cooperators nor
coherent defectors will be ”mixed” individuals. This new terms introduced here should
not be mistaken for the concepts ”pure cooperators”, ”pure defectors” and ”fluctuating
individuals” introduced in [32], which implied a temporal consistency of the agents’
strategies. Moreover, we have to take into account that a coherent behaviour is neither
trivial nor easily reachable, due to the fact that we start our simulation with all mixed
populations (randomly distributed strategies), so the dynamics that lead to coherence
is specially interesting to study.
In Figure 4.5 we show the fraction of coherent cooperators (left column), coherent defec-
tors (middle column) and mixed individuals (right column) for 5 layers (top row) and 10
layers (bottom row). The formation of coherent cooperators is particularly complicated,
and it is interesting to notice that not even in the Harmony game there is a very high
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fraction of them (except for a small area around the extreme case of T “ 0 and S “ 1).
In the other quadrants, the fraction is very small (in particular, the Prisoner’s Dilemma
presents basically no coherent cooperation). This implies that most of the cooperation
shown by the system comes from mixed individuals. We also observe that the fraction of
coherent cooperators decreases quickly with the number of layers for any game. As we
have said, the origin of such results resides in the fact that a defector takes advantage
of its own cooperative behaviour in other layers, specially in regions of the T ´ S plane
prone to cooperation.
Conversely, regarding the fraction of coherent defectors, we observe that their presence
is very strong in most of the the Prisoner’s Dilemma region and part of the Stag-Hunt
area, and they decrease only slightly when increasing the number of layers from 5 to 10.
This fact is easy to understand: the resilience of a cooperator in a hostile environment is
based basically in how he performs as cooperator, the advantage of playing as defector
in other layers is practically zero because in a large defector population the contribution
to the payoff of a defector that plays against a defector is zero, P “ 0. Thus, in these
regions, the survival rate of cooperation does not improve by playing as defector strategy
in other layers.
Regarding mixed individuals, we observe that they are very prevalent for all games (ex-
cept for the extreme area of Harmony around (T “ 0, S “ 1), where cooperation is very
profitable, and the bottom-half area of the hard Prisoner’s Dilemma where cooperation is
extremely expensive). Mixed individuals contribute significantly to the average density
of cooperation in a large central area of the T ´ S plane, particularly in the areas that
separate full-cooperation from full-defection. This area of prevalent mixed individuals
increases with the number of layers or, in other words, it gets harder and harder to be
a coherent strategist as the number of layers increases.
The first column of Figure 4.6 shows in which percentage a mixed players plays as
cooperator. It can be seen how this fractions follows the distribution of the cooperators
in the whole population that can be seen in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.5 also confirms what we showed analytically earlier: defection can survive in
the Harmony game, as long as the individual defecting in a particular layer is a mixed
individual; it plays as cooperator in other layers and obtains enough payoff from them to
avoid having to switch strategies (see also Supplementary Information for further detail
on the payoff of cooperators and defectors).
Finally, another important observation has to be made regarding the interaction between
coherent and mixed individuals. In figure 4.5, we can observe how coherent players of
opposite types do not coexist in the same population. Another important point is where
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Figure 4.6: Percentage of cooperation in mixed individuals (left column), average direct
payoff obtained playing as cooperator (middle column) and average direct payoff obtained
playing as defector (left column) for 5 layers (top row) and 10 layers (bottom row) multiplex.
coherent players can coexist with mixed players. The area where coherent cooperators
interact with mixed players is wide and gets wider as we keep adding layers to the
multiplex. However, the area of coexistence of coherent defectors and mixed players is
very narrowed and only gets slightly affected when layers are added to the structure.
This means that the coherent defection is a very dominant strategy that almost forbids
the existence of another kind of players.
4.5 Convergence
Next we study the system’s convergence to the stationary state. It is well know that the
time evolution of cooperation on a monoplex, for a value of the parameters that allows
the survival of at least some cooperation, usually follows a curve that initially decreases
a bit, while cooperation rearranges itself from the random initial conditions into a more
favorable setting, and then there is an new increase, followed by the achievement of the
stationary state. In general, this whole transient time is relatively short (typically of
1´2ˆ104). However, it hasn’t been explored in detail until now the convergence process
for the four games in the T ´ S plane on multiplex networks.
In order to study such convergence we fit the last tγ time steps to a linear model,ycptq “ α ` βt using QR decomposition method. Then we use the slope of the fitted
model to compute the variation of the density of cooperators every 1000 time steps,
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Figure 4.7: Convergence to the stationary point measured as the variation in the fraction
of cooperators during 1000 time steps, measured using the slope of a linear model fitted at
the end of tγ steps of the simulation. The numbers in each quadrant represent the mean
convergence value for each one of the four games. In rows we have the information for several
values of initial fraction of cooperators (c0 “ 0.25, c0 “ 0.50, c0 “ 0.75).
Ξ “ 1000 ¨ β. Thus, a near-zero value of this metrics indicates that the system has
reached the stationary state, while a positive value would indicate that the average level
of cooperation is still increasing in the system at that time, and vice versa. Figure 4.7
shows how every point of the T´S plane performs on our measure of convergence during
the last tγ time steps of the simulation.
Monoplex networks seem to reach the stationary state according to our convergence
criteria for every point of the plane T ´ S and independently of the initial fraction of
cooperators. We observe, however, a small amount of stochastic noise for some regions
of Hawk Dove and Prisoner’s Dilemma games, where our measure indicates that the
stationary is not fully reached. Nonetheless, we will show in Section 4.6 that this noise
is just an effect of the large fluctuations in the number of cooperators when the stationary
is reached.
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In multiplex networks, on the other hand, there is a large area where convergence is not
reached (red areas in the central and right panels of Figure 4.7). In the most extreme
cases, where the slope of the linear model β is largest, our measurements indicates an
increment of the cooperators of even a 0.1% every 1000 time steps. That could seem
a little increase in the fraction of cooperators, however if the evolutionary process runs
over a large period of time the increase could be very significant.
To better illustrate this difference in the path to stability for monoplex vs. multiplex, we
show in Figure 4.8 the time evolution of the level of cooperation, xcy as the simulation
progresses (monoplex plotted in red and two multiplex networks with different number
of layers represented in green and blue), for one point in the plane T´S. This particular
point has been picked as an extreme case, because it presents the maximum fluctuation
values found in the entire plane (see Figure 4.9 and Section 4.6 for further detail). We
clearly observe that, while the time require for the monoplex system to achieve the
stationary state is around 1´ 2ˆ 104, for the multiplex networks it can be at least one
order of magnitude larger, and it increases with the number of layers, too. However, it
is important to remember that this example shown here is a very extreme case, while
the convergence process in multiplex is in general faster for regions of the plane that are
far away from the transition area (that is, for areas where the final state is close to an
all-cooperation or all-defection).
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Figure 4.8: Example of the evolution of cooperation for the point in the plane T ´ S with
maximum fluctuations (S “ 0 and T “ 1.35). The shadowed area for each plot represents
two standard deviation over the residuals the I iterations at each time step. It will be used
to compare the size of the fluctuations between monoplex and multiplex networks. The grey
vertical area corresponds to the interval rt0, t0` tγs where all the measures shown in the panel
figures are computed.
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To understand the reason for such an increase in the convergence time for multiplex with
respect to monoplex, one has to pay attention to which areas are more reluctant to reach
stability. Such regions correspond again to the transition areas between those of total
cooperation and total defection. In the Stag Hunt quadrant, the game has an unstable
equilibrium with mixed population, that means that the game will tend to converge
to total cooperation or total defection as happens in the monoplex network. However
the multiplex structure of the network changes that behaviour, as we commented in
Section 4.3. In these structures, the transition region is larger than in the monoplex,
and is in this transition region when the convergence is hard. The analysis of how the
fraction of cooperators as an effect on the convergence give us an insight about what is
happening. We have already told that the interlayer dynamics have an important role in
the survival rate of defectors and cooperators. If we look at the multiplex columns of the
Figure 4.7, we can observe how the convergence is strongly affected by the initial fraction
of cooperators. In one hand, if the fraction of cooperators is small, they will need more
time to reach their equilibrium because the have to fight against a bigger fraction of
defectors that benefits of the interlayer dynamics. In the other hand, a bigger initial
number of cooperators implies that the defectors will need more time to reach an stable
point. However, the presence of a large number of initial cooperators has less impact
on the convergence, a perfectly normal conduct giving that defectors get more profit of
cooperating that the opposite case.
Similar conclusions could be obtained for the other games, taking into account that the
transition regions between full-cooperation and full-defection are different in nature, for
instance in the Hawk-Dove this region is open so in this regions we can see the effect of
non-convergence is diluted across the SD quadrant.
4.6 Analysis of fluctuations
Last, we turn our attention to the fluctuations of the system in the stationary state. In
the case of these four games on a monoplex network, it is well known that the level of
cooperation in the stationary state fluctuates around a well-defined average value due
the effect of both the topological structure of the network and the Replicator updating
rule. We propose a measure in order to quantify such effect and later compare it with
the cases of multiplex networks. For each one of the I repetitions of the experiment
we fit a linear model to the final tγ time steps of the simulation, ycptqi “ αi ` βit. The
effect of the trend, that is, a possible non-zero slope in the measure of fluctuations (see
in Section 4.7), has to be considered, so we average the Mean Square Error between the
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Figure 4.9: Fluctuation of the fraction of cooperator around the fitted trend at the final time
steps of the simulation computed as described in the equation (4.17), for each pair of values
S and T. The number in each quadrant represents the average value for each one of the four
games. The results are provided by 3 diferent
data from the simulations and the predictions of the linear model for the I iterations,
calculated as:
ζ “ 1
I ¨ L
Iÿ
i“1
MSEi “ 1
I ¨ L ¨ tγ
Iÿ
i“1
tγ`t0ÿ
t“t0
pcptqi ´ ycptqiq2. (4.17)
The results for monoplex and multiplex networks are displayed in Figure 4.9. The
simulations show small fluctuations in the quadrants of Stag-Hunt and Harmony Game.
However in the Hawk Dove monoplex results display a zone where fluctuations are larger
than in the rest of the plane T ´ S. That can be attributed to the nature of the game:
it has an evolutionary stable equilibrium with mixed populations, so a consensus where
both strategies coexist has to be reached. To achieve this objective some nodes have to
alternate their strategies. These changes, due the topological features of the network,
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can lead to a cascade effect of changes in a large portion of the network; the equilibrium
gets disturbed, and the equilibrium has to be reached again. This causes the fluctuations
that we have measured. It is worth noticing that in the area of mutual coexistence of
strategies the fluctuations are larger where the temptation and sucker payoffs are not
far from the payoffs of mutual cooperation and mutual defection. It is also noteworthy
that, even when the Prisoner’s Dilemma quadrant presents very small fluctuations in
general, it does show a small but very significant spot near the line of weak Prisoner’s
Dilemma, where they are large. Again, this corresponds to the area of competition
between Cooperation and Defection, where each of the strategies accounts roughly for
half the population.
The introduction of multiplex networks has an enormous effect on the measured fluc-
tuations. The fluctuations are again in the region of coexistence of strategies, however,
in the case of 5-layer multiplex the fluctuations are smaller than in the monoplex case.
The results in the 10-layer multiplex displays even a larger reduction in the measure of
fluctuations (compare also the three curves shown in Figure 4.8). The nature of such
reduction from monoplex to multiplex is to be found in the interlayer dynamics. Each
layer is pushed to reach an stable equilibrium where both strategies can coexist, nonethe-
less the shared information between the layers establishes a way to constrict the range
of the fluctuations. The change of strategy of a node in one layers is not conditioned
by its performance in that layer, but by its global performance in the entire multiplex
structure. That makes the system more robust to fluctuating nodes, at the expense of
convergence time to the stationary equilibrium. It has to be said that the initial fraction
of cooperators, c0, does not have any observable influence on the size of the fluctuations.
It is worth mentioning that the fluctuations shown in Figure 4.8 are a modified version
of equation (4.17), calculated as follows: we have to divide the time range in different
slices in the interest of realizing local accurate measures of the fluctuations in each slice,
so we fix the size of the time window to tw “ 1000. For each time slice we fit a linear
model to each of the I runs of our simulation, then we compute the residuals as the
difference between the linear model and the data from the simulations. We have I
residuals that measure the size of the fluctuations at each time step, and we plot a range
corresponding to twice their standard deviation to provide information about the size
of the fluctuations at each time step.
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Conclusions and future work
5.1 Conclusions
In this work, we have presented a systematic and complete analysis of the outcomes
of cooperation on ER multiplex networks for the four games on the T ´ S plane when
using the Replicator updating rule, comparing our results with those already known
for the case of the games on monoplex. We have examined the microscopic behavior
of the nodes and coined the terms of coherent cooperator and coherent and defector.
Also, we have analyzed the impact of layer addition to the convergence to stationary.
Finally, we have introduced a new approach to measuring the fluctuations around the
equilibrium point and, then, how we have looked to how these fluctuations get affected
by the multiplex structure.
In particular, we have found that the stationary distribution of cooperation in the plane
T ´ S becomes less sharp as more layers are added. In the monoplex case there is a
very narrow area that separates all-cooperator from all-defector areas for the Stag Hung
and Prisoner’s Dilemma games, but in the multiplex scenario we find that it becomes
a wider region, with intermediate values of cooperation. We also find that the area of
all-defectors is shrinks, as the number of layers increases. As a counter-effect though, we
find a slight decrease in the value of cooperation cooperation to values around 90% to
80% from total, even in the quadrant of the Harmony game, where we have provided a
probabilistic explanation to such effect. These results are consistent with and generalize
those found by [40]: the introduction of a multiplex structure in the population helps
promote cooperation in regions of the parameter space in which it can not survive in
the monoplex scenario, at the expense of a moderate reduction of cooperation in those
where traditionally it was very high. Regarding the dependence with the initial fraction
of cooperation, a result never discussed before for multiplex structures, we found that
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our system behaves consistently with what was found for the monoplex network, and
the effect of adding more layers is preserved or even increased with increasing initial
fraction of cooperators.
Regarding the microscopic behavior of the nodes, we have found that in general and at a
given time step, there are three types of individuals: those coherently acting as cooper-
ators in all layers, those acting as coherent defectors, and a group of mixed individuals,
that play as cooperators in some layers and as defectors in others. The existence of
this third mixed group is at the root of the explanation of the survival of defection in
the Harmony Game for a multilayered network, and it also is responsible for a large
part of the cooperation in the central areas of the T ´ S plane. Also, we have ana-
lyzed how this three player types interact between them concluding that there are a lot
of interaction between mixed and coherent cooperators, less interaction between mixed
and coherent cooperators, and practically no interaction between both types of coherent
players. Moreover, we think that this is a very plausible social scenario: some people
may behave consistently in all their types of interactions (for example at work, at home,
with friends,...) either cooperating or defecting, and some other may choose different
strategies for their different layers (for example, cooperate with family and defect at
work). We have found that an increment in the number of layers increases the fraction
of mixed players, that means that as the number of context where the a players interacts
increases gets harder to maintain the coherence of behaviour.
We have shown how convergence to a stationary equilibrium is one of the descriptors
that gets modified by the introduction of multiplex networks. More precisely, we have
shown that, in the transition regions, the convergence is more difficult to reach. In this
case, we have observed that the initial fraction of cooperators has a vast influence in the
achievement of the stationary equilibrium. As an explanation, we have proposed that
the interlayer dynamics supports more defectors playing cooperation in other layers than
cooperators playing defective strategies in a distinct layer.
Finally, we have examined the influence of the multilayered network in the fluctuations
of the number of cooperators around the stationary. We have defined a new detrended
ratio to measure such change. We have shown that the conclusions are significant. In the
Hawk-Dove, the region where the fluctuations are observed, we have observed a decrease
their size as we keep adding layers to the system.
To summarize, the introduction of multiplex networks not only is a more realistic rep-
resentation of social systems, allowing for more sophisticated individual behaviours, but
as it has been shown in other contexts too, it has a profound effect on the dynamics
developing on top of them.
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5.2 Future work
The actual work will be used as a base ground for the realization of my Ph.D. studies,
which I am currently realizing at the University Rovira i Virgili under the supervision
of Prof. Alex Arenas and Prof. Sergi Gomez. This present work is important because
introduces some descriptions that I will use through all my planned experiments, and to
get some insights of how the dynamics work. As a future line of research, I will consider
several factors.
We have preferred use in this work Erdos-Renyi networks in order to avoid the implica-
tion of use a more heterogeneous topologies, like the degree correlation between nodes
or the interlayer degree correlation. These factors could have an enormous impact in the
evolutionary dynamics. So, one of the futures lines of research will be, use a different
kind of layer network topologies and see which are the changes that we would observe,
and how the different kind of correlations acts in the system.
The impact of time-varying networks, networks that changes their structure through
time, has never studied in the context of evolutionary game theory in multiplex networks.
For instance, players that are always cooperative with a defector node could choose stop
playing with this node after n generations. The change of the network topology after
this percolation dynamic has unknown results and could have interesting implications.
In the other side, there are some research articles that explain the topology of monoplex
networks constructed using evolutionary game theory rules [33, 34]. The implementation
of this method in multiplex networks could lead to unexplored networks.
In Section 3.2.1 we have said that there is a vast amount of update rules that can be
applied to the system in order to control the evolutionary dynamics. A good objective for
the future would be to compare different update rules on top of the multiplex structure
and, after that, propose a new update rule uses all the inherent power of the multilayer
architecture.
5.3 Related talks and publications
The present work was presented in:
• 1st Mediterranean School of Complex Networks
• 1st URV Doctoral Workshop in Computer Science and Mathematics
It has been submitted to Nature Scientific Reports for publication
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